Respecting One's Fellow: QBism's Analysis of Wigner's Friend by DeBrota, John B. et al.
Respecting One’s Fellow: QBism’s Analysis of
Wigner’s Friend
John B. DeBrota,1,3 Christopher A. Fuchs,1,3 and Ru¨diger Schack2,3
1Department of Physics, University of Massachusetts Boston
100 Morrissey Boulevard, Boston MA 02125, USA
2Department of Mathematics, Royal Holloway, University of London
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, United Kingdom
3Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS)
Wallenberg Research Centre, Marais Street, Stellenbosch 7600, South Africa
5 July 2020
Abstract
According to QBism, quantum states, unitary evolutions, and measurement operators
are all understood as personal judgments of the agent using the formalism. Meanwhile,
quantum measurement outcomes are understood as the personal experiences of the same
agent. Wigner’s conundrum of the friend, in which two agents ostensibly have different
accounts of whether or not there is a measurement outcome, thus poses no paradox for
QBism. Indeed the resolution of Wigner’s original thought experiment was central to the
development of QBist thinking. The focus of this paper concerns two very instructive
modifications to Wigner’s puzzle: One, a recent no-go theorem by Frauchiger and Renner
[1], and the other a thought experiment by Baumann and Brukner [2]. We show that the
paradoxical features emphasized in these works disappear once both friend and Wigner are
understood as agents on an equal footing with regard to their individual uses of quantum
theory. Wigner’s action on his friend then becomes, from the friend’s perspective, an
action the friend takes on Wigner. Our analysis rests on a kind of quantum Copernican
principle: When two agents take actions on each other, each agent has a dual role as a
physical system for the other agent. No user of quantum theory is more privileged than
any other. In contrast to the sentiment of Wigner’s original paper, neither agent should
be considered as in “suspended animation.” In this light, QBism brings an entirely new
perspective to understanding Wigner’s friend thought experiments.
1 Introduction
Wigner’s famous thought experiment [3] is a tale of two agents. One agent, Wigner’s friend,
performs a quantum measurement in a lab and obtains an outcome. The other agent, Wigner,
treats the lab containing his friend and the friend’s experimental setup as one large quantum
system and writes down a joint quantum state which evolves continuously in time. Thus for
Wigner there is no measurement outcome. Who is right, Wigner or his friend? There is a
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difficulty here if one thinks of a measurement outcome as something objective in the sense that
it can be verified in principle by anybody.
The lesson QBism [4, 5, 6] draws from Wigner’s thought experiment is that, for consis-
tency’s sake, measurement outcomes must be regarded as personal to the agent who makes
the measurement. This idea first appeared in 2006 in Ref. [7], where the phrase “facts for the
agent” was coined. Its connection with Wigner’s friend was eventually spelled out fully in 2010
with Ref. [4], and the personal nature of an agent’s measurement outcomes was further em-
phasized in Ref. [6], where outcomes were identified with the “experiences” of the agent doing
the measurement. As emphasized, e.g., by Pusey [8], Wigner’s friend thought experiments thus
pose no problem for QBism. In fact, Wigner’s friend was central to the development of QBist
thinking [9].
Recently, variations of Wigner’s original thought experiment were introduced by Brukner
[10, 11], Frauchiger and Renner (FR) [1], and Baumann and Brukner (BB) [2].1 In Brukner’s
thought experiment, first described in 2015 [10] and thoroughly analyzed in Ref. [11], the as-
sumption that measurement outcomes are objective leads to a Bell inequality and thus to a
conflict with the predictions of quantum mechanics. Brukner concludes from this that mea-
surement outcomes should be regarded as “facts relative to the observer,” the same conclusion
QBism reached by considering the original Wigner’s friend thought experiment.
The main innovation in the very interesting FR scenario is that both Wigner and a friend
make predictions about the outcome of one and the same measurement, which is performed
by Wigner. A seemingly straightforward application of the quantum formalism then appears
to show that the predictions of Wigner and friend are mutually contradictory. Frauchiger and
Renner turn this into a formal contradiction by postulating a small number of what they believe
to be intuitive assumptions. They conclude that any interpretation of quantum mechanics has
to abandon at least one of these assumptions.
From a QBist perspective, however, there is a fundamental problem with Frauchiger and
Renner’s analysis. In their thought experiment, both Wigner and the friend are agents applying
the quantum formalism, but Frauchiger and Renner treat them in an asymmetric way. Because
Wigner is outside the lab that contains the friend, this asymmetry seems to be inherent in the
very setup of the experiment. We will show that this is not so. QBism both requires and makes
possible a fully symmetric treatment of Wigner and his friend. Wigner’s action on his friend
then becomes, from the friend’s perspective, an action the friend takes on Wigner. Once this
is taken into account, the paradoxical features of the FR thought experiment disappear.
The more recent BB scenario is similar to the FR thought experiment in that, again, both
Wigner and friend make predictions about the outcome of Wigner’s measurement. Baumann
and Brukner appear to show that applying the standard quantum formalism leads the friend to
make a bad prediction. As in the FR case, the problem with Baumann and Brukner’s analysis
is that they fail to treat the friend as an agent on the same footing as Wigner. If, instead,
Wigner and his friend are treated symmetrically, the BB scenario loses its seemingly paradoxical
character. Because the BB scenario is much simpler than the FR scenario, we will discuss it
first. Indeed it was through thinking about the BB thought experiment that we finally arrived
at our present understanding of the more intricate FR thought experiment.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the main QBist principles.
We spell out what we mean by a user of the quantum formalism, and how quantum states and
quantum measurements are thought of as personal judgments in our framework. We further
1There are too many responses to these papers to cite here, but a sampling of those which attempt to analyse
QBism’s relation to the thought experiments can be found in Refs. [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Though
Refs. [19, 20] are both very relevant to QBist interests, neither of these get at the heart of the argument made
here.
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Figure 1: (a) In usual descriptions of various Wigner’s-friend thought experiments, there is
an urge to portray everything from a God’s eye view. Here, we depict the BB thought exper-
iment, where Wigner, his friend, and a spin-1/2 particle interact, and we symbolize QBism’s
disapproval of such portrayals with a big red X. In QBism, the quantum formalism is only used
by agents who stand within the world; there is no God’s-eye view. (b) Instead, in QBism, to
make predictions, Wigner treats his friend, the particle, and the laboratory surrounding her (all
shaded in green) as a physical system external to himself. While (c) to make her own predic-
tions, the friend must reciprocally treat Wigner, the particle, and her surrounding laboratory
(all shaded in green) as a physical system external to herself. It matters not that the laboratory
spatially surrounds the friend; it, like the rest of the universe, is external to her agency, and
that is what counts.
explain how Asher Peres’s dictum that unperformed experiments have no results remains true
even when an agent is certain of what he will find. In Section 3 we review Wigner’s original
thought experiment and explain what it means for one agent to be a physical system for another
agent, distinguishing our notion from Wigner’s original where he argued that the friend must
be described as in a “suspended animation” unless the laws of physics are changed. Section 4
contains the main argument of the paper. It shows that the BB thought experiment can be
understood fully within the standard quantum formalism if Wigner and his friend are treated in
a fully symmetric fashion. We turn to the FR thought experiment in Section 5. We show that,
exactly as in the BB case, the apparent contradiction derived by Frauchiger and Renner is due
to a failure to treat one of the participants in the thought experiment as an agent in the full
sense of the word. Finally we clarify the circumstances in which one agent may adopt another
agent’s quantum state assignments and thereby address a challenge posed by Frauchiger and
Renner [1] in their subsection titled “Analysis within QBism.”
2 Agents and QBism
As there exist several authoritative accounts of QBism [21, 22, 23], this section focuses on those
aspects of QBism that are important for our argument about agents and Wigner’s friend. We
start by defining the terms “agent” and “user of quantum mechanics” and discuss some key
tenets of QBism. We then give an account of the elementary double-slit experiment in QBist
terms, in order to set the scene for the discussion of Wigner’s friend in the next section.
2.1 Agents and users of quantum mechanics
According to QBism, the quantum formalism is a tool decision-making agents can adopt to
better guide their decisions when faced with the inevitable uncertainties of the quantum world.
Particularly, the theory guides its users in how to gamble on the personal consequences of their
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measurement actions. Thus for QBism, the quantum formalism plays a normative role for its
users, not a descriptive role for exactly how the world is: It suggests how a user should gamble.
Users of the theory are thus at the center of the QBist approach. It is therefore important
to spell out what we mean by the term. In the following, we will make a distinction between
agents and users of quantum mechanics:
• Agents are entities that can take actions freely on parts of the world external to them-
selves, so that the consequences of their actions matter for them.
• A user of quantum mechanics is an agent that is capable of applying the quantum for-
malism normatively.
While our definition of a user is narrow, our definition of an agent is broad: It does not
rule out attributing agency to dogs, euglenas, or artificial life. However, it does exclude a
computer program that deterministically “chooses” an action from a look-up table. On the
other hand, as Khrennikov emphasizes in Ref. [24], “The idea is that QM is something used
only by a privileged class of people. Those educated in the methods of QM are able to make
better decisions (because of certain basic features of nature) than those not educated in the
methods of QM.” This notion of a user of the theory is sufficiently open to allow for additional
details in the future, but it is also precise enough for the purposes of this paper.
There exists a range of definitions of agency in the philosophical literature that overlap
with our definition to different degrees [25, 26]. According to the above definitions, a team of
scientists sharing notebooks, calculations, observations, etc., can act as a single agent and even
a user of quantum mechanics [27].
2.2 Some tenets of QBism
The previous subsection started with a one-paragraph summary of QBism. The following five
tenets provide more detail. Taken together they ensure QBism’s consistency.
2.2.1 What is a measurement?
A measurement is an action of an agent on its external world, where the consequences of the
action, or its outcomes, matter to the agent.
Like our definition of agent before, this definition of measurement is very broad. Basically
anything an agent can do to its external world—from opening a box of cookies, to crossing a
street, to performing a sophisticated quantum optics experiment—counts as a measurement in
our sense. The only thing that sets quantum measurement as normally construed apart from the
more mundane examples given above is whether it is fruitful or worth one’s while to apply the
quantum formalism to guide one’s actions. But, in principle a user of quantum mechanics could
use the formalism to make decisions in any measurement situation, including measurements on
living systems as in the Wigner’s friend thought experiment that are of concern here.
By applying the term measurement only to actions on the agent’s external world, we exclude
the case where an agent, directly or indirectly, acts on him or herself. We thus require a strict
separation between the agent performing the measurement and the measured system.
2.2.2 Measurement outcomes are personal
When an agent performs a measurement—that is, takes an action on its external world—the
“outcome” of the measurement is the consequence of this action for the agent. A measurement
outcome is personal to the agent doing the measurement. Thus two agents cannot experience
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the same outcome. Different agents may inform each other of their outcomes and thus agree
upon the consequences of a measurement, but a measurement outcome should not be viewed
as an agent-independent fact which is available for anyone to see [7].
This tenet has led some commentators to claim mistakenly that QBism is a form of solipsism.
This claim has been thoroughly refuted (see, e.g., Ref. [4, 28, 29, 30, 31]). That QBism is not
solipsism follows immediately from the premise that a measurement is an action on the world
external to the agent. A QBist assumes the existence of an external world from the outset.
Furthermore, the consequences of measurement actions are beyond the agent’s control—the
world can surprise the agent. The world is thus capable of genuine novelty complementary to
the agent’s actions—the world and the agent cannot be identified with each other. (See Refs.
[30, pp. 6–10] and [22, pp. 19–20], arXiv versions.)
2.2.3 A quantum state is an agent’s personal judgment
In QBism, the only purpose of the quantum formalism is to help an agent make better decisions.
Rigorous use of the formalism enables an agent to make more successful gambles. The term
“gamble” evokes games of luck, but here it is meant to encompass any action by an agent where
the consequences matter to the agent. Any physics experiment is thus a gamble in this sense.
As we will explain in more detail in the next subsection, the quantum formalism can be
viewed as an addition to classical decision theory [5, 22]. Following the approach to decision
theory pioneered by Savage [32, 33], QBism takes all probabilities, including those equal to zero
and one, to be an agent’s personal degrees of belief concerning future measurement outcomes.
Personalist probabilities [34, 35] acquire an operational meaning by their use in decision making.
A key consequence of this theory is that, to avoid sure loss, an agent’s gambles must be
constrained by the rules of probability theory.
In QBism, a quantum state is also an agent’s personal judgment, reflecting the agent’s
degrees of belief in the outcomes of all possible measurements he or she might perform. A
quantum state, rather than being a property of a quantum system, thus encodes an agent’s
expectations regarding the outcomes of future measurements.
2.2.4 The quantum formalism is normative rather than descriptive
We will see below that the quantum-mechanical Born rule can be viewed as placing additional
constraints on an agent’s probability assignments to the outcomes of different measurements [7]
in situations where pure probability theory is simply silent. In line with the central place that
QBism gives to measurement, QBism treats the Born rule as fundamental: To understand the
quantum formalism, one has to understand the Born rule first.
For a measurement with outcomes labeled j = 1, . . . , n, the Born rule is usually given in the
form pj = tr(ρEj), where Ej is a measurement operator or effect corresponding to outcome j
(for a von Neumann measurement this will be a projection operator), ρ is the density operator
for the measured system, and pj is the probability for outcome j. In QBism, ρ represents the
agent’s belief about the system, and the list of effects (or POVM) {E1, . . . , En} represents the
agent’s belief about the measurement.
In contrast to the usual reading of the Born rule as a formula for computing pj given ρ
and Ej , in QBism the Born rule functions as a consistency requirement [4, 5]. If an agent has
beliefs pj , ρ and Ej that do not satisfy the Born rule, he or she should modify at least one of
these beliefs. The formalism does not prescribe which one to modify or how to modify it.2
2It is easier to see how pj , ρ, and Ej are on an equal footing if ρ and Ej are expressed as probabilities. That
this can be done is well known: with respect to an appropriately chosen informationally complete measurement,
any density operator is equivalent to a vector of probabilities [36], and any POVM {E1, . . . , En} is characterized
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In QBism the Born rule is thus a consistency criterion that an agent should strive to satisfy
in its probability and quantum state assignments. It is a single-agent criterion; it says nothing
about consistency between the probability and quantum state assignments of different agents. It
is entirely about internal consistency of an agent’s expectations. This is what is meant by saying
that the Born rule, and thus the quantum formalism, is normative rather than descriptive.
This tenet has led some commentators to claim mistakenly that QBism is a form of instru-
mentalism. This, as with the claim of solipsism, is also easily refuted; see, e.g., Refs. [30, 37].
Indeed from its earliest days, the very goal of QBist research has been to distill a statement
about the character of the world from the fact that gambling agents should use the quantum
formalism [38]. Even though this remains an ongoing project, it has already led to a number
of strong ontological claims on the part of QBism—from the world being capable of genuine
novelty and being in constant creation, to the Born rule expressing a novel form of structural
realism [22, 30].
2.2.5 Probability-1 assignments are judgments
QBism regards even probability-1 (and probability-0) assignments as an agent’s personal judg-
ments. Assigning probability-1 to an outcome expresses the agent’s supreme confidence that the
outcome will occur, but does not imply that anything in nature guarantees that the outcome
will occur.
Similarly, QBism regards both pure and mixed quantum states as an agent’s personal judg-
ments. This implies in particular that even a statement such as “this outcome is certain to
occur” reflects an agent’s judgment rather than a fact of nature. In other words, nothing in
nature guarantees that an outcome to which an agent has assigned proobability-1 will in fact
occur.
2.3 Unperformed measurements have no outcomes, even when an
agent is certain what the outcome will be
In his 1964 Lectures on Physics, Richard Feynman famously stated that the double-slit exper-
iment exhibits “the basic peculiarities of all quantum mechanics”. “In reality, it contains the
only mystery,” he said. This idea seems to overlook the importance of quantum-foundational
results such as Bell inequalities, Kochen-Specker style noncolorability theorems, or contextu-
ality inequalities. Yet, in the end QBism believes Feynman was on the right track. Not only
does the double-slit experiment exhibit the basic peculiarities of quantum mechanics, it points
to the solution of the Wigner’s friend conundrum as well.
The double-slit experiment consists of a particle source, a screen with two slits, and a
second screen farther away from the source where the particle position is recorded. Assume
an agent has made assignments P (H0) and P (H1) for the probability that the particle passes
through the left or right slit, respectively, and P (Dj |H0) and P (Dj |H1) that the particle is
detected at position Dj given that it passes through the left or right slit, respectively. We
assume P (H0) + P (H1) = 1 and
∑
j P (Dj |H0) =
∑
j P (Dj |H1) = 1, as must be the case for
probabilities and conditional probabilities. As explained above, for these probabilities to have
operational, decision-theoretic, meaning they have to refer to actual outcomes for the agent.
Spelled out, this means P (H0) is the probability that the agent sees the particle pass through
the left slit, allowing the agent to gamble on this outcome, and P (Dj |H0) is the probability
that the agent detects the particle at Dj given that he or she has seen it pass through the left
by a stochastic matrix of conditional probabilities [5].
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slit, allowing the agent to make the corresponding conditional gamble. (The same applies, of
course, to the right slit.)
In the uncontroversial case where the agent actually intends to check which slit the particle
passes through before it hits the second screen, the agent’s probability P (Dj) for finding the
particle at Dj is given by
P (Dj) = P (H0)P (Dj |H0) + P (H1)P (Dj |H1) . (1)
This follows from probability theory alone.
But what if the agent does not intend to check which slit the particle passes through? In
this case we are dealing with a different experiment for which probability theory alone does
not constrain the agent’s probabilities. The classical intuition in this situation is to continue to
use Eq. (1) for the probability of detecting the particle at Dj , which amounts to the physical
postulate that as far as this probability is concerned, it does not matter whether the agent does
or does not check which slit the particle goes through.
This classical intuition has to be abandoned in quantum mechanics. Whether a measure-
ment is performed or not matters profoundly. Asher Peres expressed this in his famous slogan
“Unperformed experiments have no results.” [39]
Crucially, in a quantum analysis of the double-slit experiment, there is no change in either
the values or the meaning of the probabilities P (H0), P (H1), P (Dj |H0), and P (Dj |H1). For
instance, P (Dj |H0) is still the agent’s probability to detect the particle at Dj given that the
agent saw it pass through the left slit. In his paper “The Concept of Probability in Quantum
Mechanics” [40], Feynman makes a similar point and then goes on to write that “[w]hat is
changed, and changed radically, is the method of calculating probabilities.”
Here QBism departs from Feynman’s view in one significant way. In the uncontroversial
case that the agent intends to do an intermediate measurement to check which slit the particle
goes through, the quantum rules do not lead to a change of the probabilities P (Dj) as given
in Eq. (1). If the agent does not intend to do the intermediate measurement, however, Eq. (1)
no longer applies because the probabilities P (H0), P (H1), P (Dj |H0), and P (Dj |H1) now refer
to a hypothetical intermediate measurement. Thus probability theory alone no longer gives a
formula for the probability of finding the particle at Dj . The “radically” new quantum method
of calculating probabilities in this case should therefore not be viewed as a change of, but as an
addition to, existing methods. Probability theory remains fully valid in the quantum realm.
As we stated in Section 2.2.5, QBism takes the stand that even when an agent assigns
probability-1 to one of the possible outcomes of a measurement, there is nothing in the agent’s
external world that metaphysically ensures it will necessarily come about. For “unperformed
measurements have no outcomes” is a statement about the assumed character of the world,
whereas a probability-1 assignment is only a belief (supremely strong, but nonetheless a belief)
that someone happens to have in the moment. That unperformed measurements have no results
is, for QBism, the great lesson of all the Bell-inequality and Kochen-Specker-theorem results
of the last half century, more recently reinforced by the “no-go theorems” of Pusey, Barrett,
and Rudolph [41] and Colbeck and Renner [42]. It plays a central role in the QBist approach
to Wigner’s friend.
3 Wigner’s Friend
Wigner described his thought experiment in a 1961 paper entitled “Remarks on the Mind-
Body Question” [3]. Below we use a slightly modernized version of Wigner’s notation. The
friend (who prefers the pronouns “she” and “her”) performs a two-outcome measurement on
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a quantum system, where the outcomes correspond to the states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, respectively.
In order to be consistent with the BB scenario discussed in Section 4 below, we assume that
|ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are states of a spin-1/2 particle corresponding to “spin up” and “spin down”,
respectively. After the friend’s measurement, Wigner contemplates a simple measurement on
her, consisting of the question: what was the result of your spin measurement?
The assumption is now that Wigner assigns a quantum state to the joint system consisting
of particle and his friend, and treats it as a closed quantum system. After the friend has
measured the spin, Wigner’s joint state becomes
|Φ〉 = α|ψ1〉|χ1〉+ β|ψ2〉|χ2〉 , (2)
where |χ1〉 and |χ2〉 are Wigner’s states for his friend and correspond to her responding to the
question “what was the result of your spin measurement” with “up” and “down”, respectively.
In his 1961 paper, Wigner argued that the question of whether the friend saw “up” or
“down” was already decided in her mind, before Wigner asked her. Here is what Wigner
concludes from this, in his own words (excepting our modernized notation):
If we accept this, we are driven to the conclusion that the proper wave function
immediately after the interaction of friend and object was already either |ψ1〉|χ1〉
or |ψ2〉|χ2〉 and not the linear combination α|ψ1〉|χ1〉 + β|ψ2〉|χ2〉. This is a con-
tradiction, because the state described by the wave function α|ψ1〉|χ1〉+ β|ψ2〉|χ2〉
describes a state that has properties which neither |ψ1〉|χ1〉 nor |ψ2〉|χ2〉 has. If we
substitute for “friend” some simple physical apparatus, such as an atom [. . . ], this
difference has observable effects and there is no doubt that α|ψ1〉|χ1〉 + β|ψ2〉|χ2〉
describes the properties of the joint system correctly, the assumption that the wave
function is either |ψ1〉|χ1〉 or |ψ2〉|χ2〉 does not [Wigner’s italics]. If the atom is
replaced by a conscious being, the wave function α|ψ1〉|χ1〉+ β|ψ2〉|χ2〉 (which also
follows from the linearity of the equations) appears absurd because it implies that
my friend was in a state of suspended animation before [she] answered my question.
It follows that the being with a consciousness must have a different role in
quantum mechanics than the inanimate measuring device: the atom considered
above. In particular, the quantum mechanical equations of motion cannot be linear
if the preceding argument is accepted. This argument implies that “my friend”
has the same types of impressions and sensations as I—in particular, that, after
interacting with the object, [she] is not in that state of suspended animation which
corresponds to the wave function α|ψ1〉|χ1〉+ β|ψ2〉|χ2〉.
QBism, along with most other current interpretations of quantum mechanics, does not
restrict the applicability of quantum mechanics to inanimate devices. An agent can apply the
normative quantum calculus to any part of the world external to him or herself, including
conscious beings and other agents. So how does QBism escape the conclusions that Wigner
draws from his thought experiment?
Part of the answer is straightforward and follows directly from the QBist tenets. Wigner’s
quantum state |Φ〉 is not descriptive: it does not describe properties of the joint system to
which it refers. The exclusive role of |Φ〉 is to help Wigner quantify his expectations regarding
the consequences of his future actions on friend and particle. In the same way, the friend’s state
assignments refer to her expectations regarding the consequences of her future actions. There
is simply no conflict between these two perspectives. In particular, Wigner’s state assignment
has no bearing on whether the friend is or is not in a “state of suspended animation”.
This straightforward resolution of Wigner’s paradox has profound implications for the QBist
worldview. A few lines below the quoted passage, Wigner points out that insisting on the
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superposition state |Φ〉 for particle and friend, though not necessarily a contradiction, amounts
to denying “the existence of the consciousness of a friend” to an intolerable extent. In QBism,
a quantum state assignment has no bearing on the existence of the consciousness of a friend.
It follows that a QBist can simultaneously assign the state |Φ〉 and grant his friend a conscious
experience of having seen either “up” or “down”.
This claim requires some elaboration. The scenario of Wigner’s friend can be understood as a
version of the double-slit experiment, in line with Feynman’s dictum that the latter contains the
basic peculiarities of all quantum mechanics. As in our analysis of the double-slit experiment,
none of the probabilities considered in Wigner’s paper change their value or their meaning
when Wigner writes down his quantum state |Φ〉. The only implications of Wigner assigning a
quantum state to the friend are that, (i) as far his probabilities for the outcomes of some future
quantum measurement on the friend are concerned, it matters whether or not he first asks
her whether she saw up or down, and (ii) that he should use the Born rule to compute these
probabilities. There is no reason why Wigner cannot assign a quantum state that respects all
of his beliefs about the friend’s inner life, conscious experiences, or agenthood.
The parallel with the double-slit experiment is somewhat hidden in Wigner’s original argu-
ment, because he only considers measurements on the friend that, in the double-slit experiment,
correspond to determining which slit the particle went through. But, as Wigner makes clear
when he writes that “there is no doubt that [|Φ〉] describes the properties of the joint system
correctly”, assigning the state |Φ〉 amounts to committing to predictions for the outcomes of a
wide range of quantum measurements on the friend, including those for which the predictions
depend on whether or not the friend is first asked what she saw. In the context of the Wigner’s
friend scenario, such measurements were first considered by David Deutsch [43]. They are
crucial for the BB thought experiment, to which we will now turn.
4 The Friend’s Perspective: Response to Baumann &
Brukner
Baumann and Brukner’s thought experiment [2] is a simple modification of Wigner’s original
scenario. After the friend has made her measurement, Wigner’s joint state of particle and friend
is again given by Eq. (2), where it is now assumed that α = β = 1/
√
2, so that we have
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
(
|ψ1〉|χ1〉+ |ψ2〉|χ2〉
)
. (3)
Whereas in Wigner’s paper, Wigner contemplates a simple measurement on the friend consisting
of asking her about the result of her spin measurement, Baumann and Brukner let Wigner do
the measurement
MW : {|Φ〉〈Φ|, 1− |Φ〉〈Φ|} . (4)
Such a measurement is far beyond any current and probably future experimental possibilities,
but if we allow Wigner to write down the state |Φ〉, we must also allow him to contemplate
the measurement MW . Clearly, Wigner has a probability p = 1 of obtaining the outcome
corresponding to |Φ〉〈Φ|, which is labeled “+” in Ref. [2].
Baumann and Brukner’s main claim concerns the friend’s prediction for the “+” outcome.
They argue that, if in her spin measurement the friend obtains “up”, her probability of “+” is
given by applying MW to the state |ψ1〉|χ1〉, and if she obtains “down”, she should apply MW
to the state |ψ2〉|χ2〉. In both cases, her probability for “+” is 1/2. Since this probability is the
same for “up” and “down”, she can communicate her prediction to Wigner without affecting the
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rest of the experiment. Baumann and Brukner’s claim thus leads to the troubling conclusion
that two different ways of applying the rules of quantum mechanics give contradictory numbers
for the probability of “+”. 3
In the above account it might appear problematic that, in QBism, the outcome of the
measurement MW is personal to Wigner. But Baumann and Brukner show a valid way around
this problem by stipulating that Wigner record the outcome of his measurement on a piece of
paper. The friend’s probability assignment can then be regarded as referring to her finding “+”
upon checking the piece of paper.
The real problem with the BB analysis is that for the friend to base her prediction on the
state |ψ1〉|χ1〉 (or |ψ2〉|χ2〉) amounts to assigning a quantum state to herself, which violates the
QBist tenet that there must be a clear separation between agent and measured system. It is
easy to see why this leads to a serious difficulty. Assume for the moment that the friend writes
down |ψ1〉|χ1〉 for the joint system of particle and herself and uses it to compute her probability
for what she will see on the piece of paper. This state assignment would not just commit her
to a probability for outcome “+”. It would commit her to probabilities for any measurement
that she could perform on the particle and herself. For instance, according to our discussion in
Section 3, the state |χ1〉 corresponds to her responding with “up” to the question “what was
the result of your spin measurement”. But since she is a free agent, she has control over the
answer to this question. It is up to her whether she replies “up”, “down”, or by sticking her
tongue out. Since she has at least partial control over these measurement outcomes, the above
quantum-state assignment cannot form a reliable basis for guiding her actions.
So what should the friend do instead? The answer has already been given in the Introduction
and Figure 1. Rather than adopting Wigner’s viewpoint, she needs to analyze the experiment
as an action that she takes on the particle, the lab, Wigner, and the piece of paper on which
Wigner records his outcome. In particular, this requires her reversing roles and treating Wigner
as a physical system. That this would be an enormously complex and practically infeasible task
is hardly a valid objection given the assumption that Wigner is able to write down a quantum
state for her. Indeed, an even-handed analysis of the thought experiment clearly requires the
assumption that the friend is as skillful a user of quantum mechanics as Wigner himself.
What probability should the friend assign to her finding “+” on the piece of paper? This
depends on her prior states, unitaries, and POVMs regarding the lab and Wigner. The only
constraint on her probability for “+” is that it should be consistent with her prior quantum
assignments in the sense given in Section 2.2.4, i.e., it should be consistent with the Born
rule. This implies that the friend’s probability for “+” cannot be derived from the details
provided in the BB thought experiment. Furthermore, if the experiment is repeated many
times as envisaged by Baumann and Brukner, the formalism will typically lead her to update
her assignments after each repetition. Her probabilities will thus reflect what she learned in
previous runs of the experiment.
Here is a summary of our argument. In the same way that Wigner does not take the
friend’s viewpoint into account when he computes his probability of “+”, the friend need not
take Wigner’s viewpoint into account when she computes her probability of “+”. This puts
Wigner and the friend on an equal footing. In particular, the friend’s quantum state assignments
is not a function of Wigner’s quantum states |χ1〉 and |χ2〉. We thus explicitly reject Baumann
and Brukner’s claim that standard quantum theory requires the friend to base her probability
assignments on |χ1〉 and |χ2〉. In contrast to Baumann and Brukner, who propose that the
friend uses a modified Born rule incorporating Wigner’s perspective, our symmetric QBist
3Baumann and Brukner assume the experiment is repeated many times, so that the alleged contradiction
can be phrased in frequentist terms. From a QBist perspective, the full force of the contradiction arises already
in the single-case analysis given here.
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treatment of Wigner and his friend requires no such modification.
5 Reasoning about Other Agents: Response to Frauchiger
& Renner
Frauchiger and Renner’s thought experiment, which considers four agents, is somewhat intri-
cate, but here only the following broad outline is needed. Two agents, F (the friend) and F¯,
are located in separate labs. The other two agents, W (Wigner) and W¯, are on the outside and
perform measurements on the labs. At time t = 0, agent F¯ prepares a qubit in a given state,
measures it, prepares a spin-1/2 particle in a state that depends on the measurement outcome,
and sends the particle to agent F’s (the friend’s) lab. At t = 1, the friend measures the particle.
At t = 2, agent W¯ measures F¯’s lab in a given basis. Finally, at t = 3, Wigner measures the
friend’s lab in a given basis.
Wigner now uses two different methods to make predictions for the outcome of his mea-
surement. He is interested in the probability of one of the outcomes, labeled w=fail. His first
prediction uses the quantum formalism. For his second prediction, he reasons about what pre-
dictions the other agents would have made at earlier stages of the experiment, assuming all
agents start from the same initial quantum state assignment. Frauchiger and Renner argue
that the two methods lead to mutually contradictory predictions.
When reasoning about other agents, Wigner, agent W¯, and the friend apply FR’s
Assumption (C): Suppose that agent A has established that “I am certain that
agent A′, upon reasoning within the same theory as the one I am using, is certain
that x = ξ at time t.” Then agent A can conclude that “I am certain that x = ξ at
time t.”
The FR argument starts with agent F¯ making, immediately after time t = 0, a prediction
about Wigner’s measurement outcome. Since the measured system is the friend’s lab, agent
F¯’s prediction is about a part of her external world. The next step is that the friend applies
Assumption (C) to make F¯’s prediction her own. Then W¯ applies Assumption (C) to make the
friend’s and thus F¯’s prediction his own. Finally Wigner applies Assumption (C) to make W¯’s
and thus also the friend’s and F¯’s prediction his own. These steps are cleverly arranged in time
so that they don’t clash with the different measurements.
Notice that all four agents’ predictions concern the same outcome, namely w=fail in Wigner’s
measurement of the lab containing the friend. This means in particular that the FR argument
depends on the friend making a prediction about Wigner’s measurement on herself. In their
table 3, Frauchiger and Renner make this explicit by stating the friend’s conclusion as “I am
certain that [Wigner] will observe w=fail at time [t = 3].”
But this means we are now in the same situation as in the previous section when we analyzed
the BB thought experiment. The friend can use the quantum formalism to make a prediction
for Wigner’s outcome (more precisely, for what she will find when she checks a record of
Wigner’s outcome). But she is not required to base her prediction on agent F¯’s or Wigner’s
state assignments. She will have to analyze the experiment as an action that she takes on
the other lab and the other agents. Similar to the discussion of the BB thought experiment,
the contradiction derived by FR is resolved if the symmetry between Wigner and his friend is
recognized.
Frauchiger and Renner state correctly that Assumption (C) is rejected by QBism. This
does not mean that there is a prohibition in QBism for one agent to adopt another agent’s
probability or state assignments. A QBist agent will have to decide on a case by case basis
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whether or not to do so. A straightforward way of making use of other agents’ probabilities
in one’s decision making is simply to ask them what their probabilities are and to treat the
answers as data which they may or may not take into account in their own probabilities.
The most common scenario in which scientists adopt each others’ probability and state
assignments is that of a team working jointly on a quantum experiment and acting as a single
agent and user of quantum mechanics. It follows from the definitions given in Section 2.1
that scientists in such a team must have common probability and state assignments. The
requirement of a strict separation between agent and measured system now translates into a
strict separation of team and measured system. For the FR thought experiment this means
that its four players cannot be thought of as acting as a single agent, because they perform
measurements on each other.
In a subsection of their paper, titled “Analysis within QBism”, Frauchiger and Renner write
that “Nevertheless, there should be ways for agents to consistently reason about each other.”
In this paper we have provided such a way. For two users of quantum mechanics who interact,
it requires each of them to treat their interaction as an action he or she takes freely on the
other.
6 Conclusion
We have seen that the thought experiments described by Frauchiger and Renner and by Bau-
mann and Brukner have a key aspect in common. In each of them, an agent (the friend) is
using quantum mechanics to predict the consequences of an action performed on her by another
agent (Wigner). We have shown that the paradoxa found by these authors disappear if the
friend analyses the experiment as an action she performs on the world outside herself, which
includes Wigner. These thought experiments thus illustrate what we have called a quantum
Copernican principle: when two agents take actions on each other, each agent has a dual role
as a physical system for the other agent.
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